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Summary
Material nihilism, also known as compositional nihilism, is the view that there 
are no such things as material objects with proper parts – that is, there are no 
such things as physical composite objects as tables and mountains. In my 
paper, I will present and examine in detail three contemporary arguments often 
associated with the view.  Peter van Inwagen argues for the view because he 
thinks it provides the best answer to what he terms the Special Composition 
Question. Trenton Merricks argues that there are no material composite 
objects on pain of causal overdetermination. And Peter Unger provides an 
updated twist of Sorites-style reasoning for material nihilism in what is known 
as the problem of the many. I will examine these arguments through the lens 
of reductionism; in doing so I will point to ways in which the ongoing debate 
over material nihilism can be further developed. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction
Material nihilism is the view that there are no material objects with proper 
parts. This view is sometimes referred to as ‘compositional nihilism’, or, 
simply, ‘nihilism’. I choose to term it ‘material nihilism’ only because it 
would be good to focus our attention on concrete, material objects as opposed 
to abstract entities. By ‘material’ I mean ‘physical’, and by that I mean ‘has 
extension in space and time’. A material object X has proper parts x1 and x2 if 
and only if x1 and x2 are parts of X, and x1 is not identical to X and x2 is not 
identical to X. Parthood should be understood here in a basic, intuitive way, in 
a way similar to how we consider the four legs of a table to be parts of the 
table. We might take this to immediately render material nihilism false, for 
obviously we do consider the four legs of a table to be proper parts of that 
table, so there are material objects with proper parts. A material nihilist would 
deny there is a material object that has the four legs as parts to begin with.
There are a number of reasons why a material nihilist might think there is no 
such material object (that is, the table) to begin with. He might object to the 
presence of such composite objects because he might think there is no 
principled, unobjectionable way in which the process of composition can be 
defined or understood. Or he might think that composite objects would 
overdetermine effects their parts sufficiently caused. And on pain of accepting 
such systematic overdetermination we ought to hold there are no composite 
material objects. He might also object to the existence of such objects as he 
might think that whatever reason we have for positing a table here, is as good
a reason for positing many more tables in the vicinity; but there aren’t many 
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more tables in the vicinity, so we don’t have a good reason for claiming the 
existence of our initial table. These lines of reasoning have been advanced by 
Peter van Inwagen, Trenton Merricks, Peter Unger, and Peter Geach. We will 
look at their arguments in detail in chapters two, three and four respectively. 
The objective of this paper is twofold. (1) I hope to present a close, careful and 
comprehensive look at the aforementioned arguments; it is my view that a 
holistic yet thorough analysis of these arguments is absent from the existing 
literature. (2) Building on (1), I hope to lay the groundwork for a better 
understanding of what exactly material nihilism is, and who its targets are. In 
particular, we will look at various reductionist replies one can make to these 
nihilistic arguments. By and large, it might be thought that reductionism
instead of material nihilism would be the more sensible position to take. Why 
eliminate composite objects when we can simply reduce them to simpler 
entities? As it will emerge, this is a legitimate question to ask. At the same 
time, however, the debate between reductionists and material nihilists is a 
muddy one. Reductionism comes in several forms, and as we shall see, not all 
of our nihilistic arguments are firmly opposed to all forms of reductionism. Or, 
more precisely: not all of our nihilistic arguments seem to have a firm 
response to all forms of reductionism. This might be thought to be a problem 
for material nihilism. And perhaps it is. But in any case, understanding what 
sorts of reductionism material nihilism is up against will ultimately be useful 
in advancing the debate between material nihilists and their more temperate 
counterparts the reductionists. With this in mind, I will spend the rest of this 
chapter outlining the various types of reductionism.
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I propose two broad categories for reductionism in these debates: N-
reductionism, and N+1-reductionism1. N-reductionists hold that there are 
tables and other composite material objects, but these objects are nothing 
“over and above” their constituent parts. An atom made of two simple 
particles – where a simple is a fundamental-level object that has no proper 
parts – is nothing “over and above” those two particles. So if we were to count 
the number of objects here, we would say there are only two objects – the two 
particles. There is loosely speaking a third object, the atom, but to count three 
objects in this scenario would be akin to counting all the parts of a chicken, 
and the entire chicken itself. More generally, for any N simple particles we 
count, there would be N objects present, no more and no less, no matter how 
these particles might be grouped or “fused” together. Hence the name N-
reductionism. 
N+1-reductionism, on the other hand, holds that in at least some 
circumstances, there are composite material objects “over and above” their 
constituent material parts. In our atom example, they might hold there are 
three objects present – the two particles and the atom itself. More generally, 
for any N simple particles we count, if they compose a single material object, 
then the N+1 reductionist would say there are N+1 objects present. Now, we 
might think it strange why anyone would count in such a manner (I will come 
to the reductionist bit in a moment). As far as I can see, one motivation for 
doing so is to justify the distinctness between the whole and the collection of 
its parts. Our atom might have certain emergent properties none of our simple 
                                               
1 To be sure, the N and N+1-views that I’m about to mention are not views specifically tied to 
reductionism. They are views which can be taken independently of reductionism. 
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particles possess, for example; and our chicken might possess a different set of 
persistence conditions from the collection of its parts. It might survive 
debeaking for example, but the collection of its parts can’t. N+1 reductionists 
might take this to show that there is a wholly distinct object “over and above”
its constituent parts. 
Let’s group reductionisms which hold the N-view under the label complete
reductionism. And let’s group reductionisms which hold the N+1-view under 
the label emergentist reductionism. The key difference between these two 
views, it should be reemphasized, lies in how many objects one thinks there 
are in the vicinity of an apparent composite object. Nihilists and complete 
reductionists alike count N, where N is the total number of simple objects in 
the vicinity; emergentist reductionists count N+1.
Complete reductionism can be further split into two categories: identity 
reductionism, and simple reductionism. An identity reductionist holds that the 
composite whole is identical to the set containing all and only its apparent
parts. We can clearly see why identity reductionists are of the N-view. It’s 
hard to accurately characterize simple reductionism, but broadly simple
reductionists hold that X reduces to Y if and only if X exists wholly in virtue of 
Y.  It will be best to think of this in terms of examples. A common one would 
be simple reductionism about heat: there is such a thing as heat, but it exists 
wholly in virtue of molecular kinetic energy. Or mental phenomena: there are 
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such things as mental phenomena, but they exist wholly in virtue of physical 
phenomena2. 
Emergentist reductionists hold the N+1 view, and that whatever an object is 
being reduced to can reductively explain the object being reduced, where to 
reductively explain something is understood as: Y reductively explains X if 
and only if we can wholly understand X just in Y-terms. In other words, 
understanding Y is all we need to understand X. It is a matter of some debate 
whether reductive explanation is logically equivalent to simple reductionism3.
In this paper they will not be treated as being logically equivalent, but nothing 
too much will turn on this. If it turns out they are indeed logically equivalent, 
then remarks applied to one can equally be applied to the other. 
I believe it is important to sort reductionism out as above, as too often nihilists 
have grappled with reductionism without being fully clear on what they are 
dealing with. Merricks (2001), for example, writes:
Composition as identity is false. So every composite object is distinct from – i.e. not 
identical with – its parts. So every such object is something ‘in addition to’ its parts. 
- pg 28. 
In denying composition as identity Merricks is effectively denying identity 
reductionism; but his alternative is to shift to emergentist reductionism (or at 
least the N+1 view). If complete reductionism is a viable alternative however, 
then Merricks’ conclusion is unwarranted: composition as identity could be 
                                               
2 Here’s a stab at a more precise definition: X reduces to a spatiotemporal configuration X1 if 
and only if a spatiotemporal complex X1 is understood as the arrangement of particles 
ostensibly constituting the existence of X; and necessarily, X exists if X1 esists. I’m not sure if 
all complete reductionists would agree with this characterization, so sticking with the 
preceding would do for our purposes. 
3 Kim (2008) seems to think so. Some of the material just mentioned is owed to his paper.  
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false, and every composite object is distinct from its parts, but it’s false that 
every such object is something ‘in addition to’ its parts.
Elsewhere, Rosen & Dorr in their paper “Composition as a Fiction” make a 
case for material nihilism (or what they call compositional nihilism) – but one 
of the key contenders they consider is emergentist reductionism, or what is 
also referred to as “naïve common sense”, which puts forth similar counting 
claims as brought forth for emergentist reductionism earlier (see Rosen & 
Dorr, 2002: 151-152). Yet we might think complete reductionism, insofar as 
it’s a coherent thesis on its own, would be the stronger contender, so the 
authors have missed the mark there. Further, in the course of this paper we
will see that various moves made in defense of nihilism are effective against 
emergentist reductionism, but have less force against simple reductionism. 
A couple of last notes. In the rest of this paper I will discard identity 
reductionism when talking about complete reductionism. The sole reason is 
that I’m inclined to think identity reductionism is virtually indistinguishable 
from material nihilism. To be sure, identity reductionism maintains there is a 
composite whole; nihilism says there isn’t. But since nihilists would agree 
there is a set containing all and only of that object’s apparent parts, agreeing 
there is a composite whole in this sense doesn’t seem to undermine the spirit 
of nihilism. Whether simple reductionism itself is indistinguishable from 
material nihilism is a tougher call; perhaps ploughing through the fields is the 
only way to decide for ourselves. There may be other ways of cashing out 
reductionisms holding the N-view; but if so, I’m not aware of what they are. 
Page 12 of 66
With identity reductionism discarded then, I will proceed to take complete 
reductionism to be synonymous with simple reductionism. Also unless 
specified, I will use the terms ‘reductionism’ or ‘reductionist’ to refer to 
reductionisms of both the N and N+1 variety, and adherents thereof.  
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Chapter 2: The Special Composition Question
Peter van Inwagen, in his book Material Beings, argues that only simples and 
living organisms (which are composite objects) exist. In this chapter I will 
provide a reconstruction of his argument and put forth some reductionist 
remarks. We should note here that van Inwagen in no way puts forth the 
argument of his book along the following logically valid lines explicitly. I do 
believe, however, that he was driven to his conclusion along these very lines, 
and so while they may seem to depart from his work in letter, I believe they 
remain true to his work in spirit. Summarizing van Inwagen’s position in the 
following way will indeed give us a good, comprehensive handle on his book-
long treatise. 
In a nutshell, van Inwagen thinks that only simples and living organisms exist 
because that’s  the best answer to what he calls the Special Composition 
Question. Van Inwagen’s Special Composition Question (henceforth SCQ) is 
this: When is it true that y the xs compose y? (van Inwagen, 1990: 30). And 
his answer is this: y the xs compose y iff the activity of the xs constitutes a 
life (pg. 90). My dissection of van Inwagen’s position lies in three parts. I’ll 
start off with some assumptions he makes regarding the SCQ. Part II of his 
argument concludes that prima facie, composite objects don’t exist, in the 
following sense: a composite object doesn’t exist, unless we have good 
independent reason to believe in that composite object. (More on this later). 
Part III provides an independent reason that living composite objects exist. 
Together they’ll form van Inwagen’s argument for his ontology. 
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1. Van Inwagen’s Argument
Part I
First, the assumptions:
1a) There is one (and only one) right answer to the SCQ.
1b) Any answer to the SCQ is either uniform or disjunctive in nature.  
These are assumptions van Inwagen implicitly makes in using the SCQ to 
establish his position. I take 1b) to be uncontroversial. A disjunctive answer to 
the SCQ is one which puts forth that there are different bonding relations in 
virtue of which composition takes places for different objects; a uniform 
answer is one which puts forth either there is only one bonding relation in 
virtue of which composition takes place, or there is no bonding relation at all 
(that is to say, there is nothing one can do to some xs to make it compose some 
y)4.The key difference between the two sorts of answer is disjunctive answers 
imply that bonding relations correspond, or are somehow related, to the types 
of objects there are in the world. Uniform answers, on the other hand, hold 
that bonding relations are insensitive to the types of objects there are in the 
world. As Markosian (1998) characterizes (some) disjunctive-type answers: 
‘there are different types of object in the world, and that for each such type, 
there is some unique relation such that whenever some xs of that type stand in 
that relation to one another, then there is an object composed of those xs’ (pg 
229). An example of a disjunctive answer to the SCQ would run along the 
following lines:
y the xs compose y iff
                                               
4 Both nihilism and universalism – the view that two things always compose a further third 
thing – are consistent with this. Both of these theories give uniform answers to the SCQ. 
Nihilism’s answer: y the xs compose y iff there is only one of the xs. Universalism’s answer: 
y the xs compose y iff the xs exist. (See van Inwagen Ch.8 for more on this). 
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the xs are particles and are maximally P-bonded or the xs are atoms and are 
maximally A-bonded or the xs are molecules and are maximally M-bonded.
Or, alternatively:
y the xs compose y iff
y is a table and the xs are fastened together with some minimum force F or y is 
a sandcastle and the xs are placed in contact with each other with some 
minimum force F2, etc. 
(Note that in the latter case bonding relations are individuated by macro-
objects, not micro-objects, as in the former case. So Markosian’s quip falls 
short here but the general point still is that there are different bonding relations 
tied to different sorts of objects for disjunctive-style answers).
An example of a uniform answer, on the other hand, would be: 
y the xs compose yiff
the xs are placed in contact with each other with some minimum force F. 
Uniform answers are insensitive to the types of objects there are in the 
following way: there might be many types of objects in the world, but we 
don’t need to figure out what type of physical objects are here to determine if 
composition has taken place. We need only to determine if a certain spatio-
causal relation obtains amongst them. In this sense, composition is just a 
matter of that single (bonding) relation5.
                                               
5 Or composition is a matter of no such relation at all. See footnote one.  
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Some of the terms in the above examples could be defined more precisely. But 
the broad distinction between a uniform and disjunctive answer to the SCQ 
should be clear enough. Understood as positing a differing number of bonding 
relations in virtue of which composition takes place, we can translate 1b) to: 
Any answer to the SCQ either involves at most one bonding relation or
involves more than one bonding relation. And that should be uncontroversial 
enough. So we should accept 1b). 
Why assume, though, that the SCQ has an answer at all? First, we should 
distinguish this from the idea that the SCQ has a complicated answer, by 
which I mean an answer that goes along the lines of “sometimes, under so and 
so conditions, the xs compose a y, but under slightly differing so and so 
conditions, they don’t, or they compose a different sort of y”. A complicated 
answer of this sort – which is, one might think, a form of disjunctive answer 
discussed above – does form an answer to the SCQ, however complicated or 
unknowable the conditions for composition might be. 
When we say there is no answer to the SCQ then, I take it that we don’t mean 
to say the answer is simply too complicated and unknowable. I take it that we 
mean to say the question is incomplete or ill-formed in some way – that it 
doesn’t get off the ground in the first place. A question such as “How many 
hours are there?” is such a question; the usual response to this is to clarify 
what the question is about: do we mean to ask how many hours are there in a 
day, or how many hours does it take to travel to New York from Singapore, 
and so on.And it seems there are no right answers to such questions, not in a 
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strict sense anyway. But the SCQ doesn’t seem to be such a question. It seems 
like a reasonable, cogent question to ask, and it seems like there should be a 
reasonable answer. So we should grant 1a) as well6. 
I will now move on the Part II of van Inwagen’s overall argument. It will 
contain premises 2) to 5), and the conclusion will be 6):prima facie, any right 
answer to the SCQ would rule out composite objects. 
Part II
2) A disjunctive answer is highly implausible. 
Recall that a disjunctive answer to the SCQ is one that posits the presence of 
differing relations in virtue of which composition can occur. Van Inwagen has 
a number of misgivings about such answers (see pages 64-71), primarily of 
which is that disjunctive answers seem to be “ad-hoc”. This can be best seen 
in our second example of a disjunctive answer above. In that instance, it seems 
like we already had a preconceived notion of what composite objects exist –
tables and sandcastles, for example – and we then ‘devise’ (as van Inwagen 
puts it) what composition relations there are between the respective parts to 
get the composite objects we want.
Some readers here, I suspect, may wonder what exactly is so objectionable 
about that. And this would, I think point to a fundamental divide between van 
Inwagen and some of his detractors. The fundamental divide is this: van 
Inwagen takes composition to be a mind-independent process or relation – it’s 
something that occurs or can occur in nature independently of any human 
                                               
6Chapters 6 to 9 of van Inwagen’s book contain a more detailed look at some of the mentioned 
proposed answers to the SCQ, and others. As noted before, though, 1a) and 1b) are 
assumptions that van Inwagen does not explicitly state.  
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activity.  To devise composition relations, then, is patently objectionable 
because that would be taking composition to be something other than a 
“naturally occurring”, mind-independent process. As van Inwagen puts it (as 
one of his ten assumptions prefacing his book):
Whether certain objects add up to or compose some larger object does not depend on 
anything besides the spatial and causal relations they bear to one another. If, for 
example, someone wants to know whether the bricks in a certain brickyard make up a 
composite object, he need not attend to anything outside the brickyard, for no 
information gathered from that quarter could possibly be relevant to the question. An 
important special case of this general principle is the following: he need not attend to 
the beliefs, attitudes, or interests of any person outside the brickyard. (Or inside it, for 
that matter...)
- van Inwagen, 1990: 12. 
To put the point more precisely: detractors of van Inwagen hold that certain 
composite objects exist pretheoretically, and use the nature of their 
composition as a detail of their existences. Van Inwagen takes a different 
approach: he sets out to investigate the nature of composition, and uses that as 
a guide to which composite objects exist. If van Inwagen’s approach is right, 
the objectionable ad-hocness lies in presuming certain composite objects to 
exist even before we’ve grasped in any detail the nature of composition7. 
Van Inwagen has another worry about disjunctive answers: they are 
‘disgracefully messy’. This can be seen from the fact that we’re going to need 
multiple bonding relations for any disjunctive answer. Being messy (that is, 
complex) can’t constitute an objection in itself of course. What van Inwagen is 
trying to get at, I think, is that nature itself can’t work in such an untidy 
manner. It would be quite strange if, for example, the relation that holds 
between sandcastle-simples (the simples involved in a putative sandcastle) 
                                               
7Detractors of the sort mentioned include Thomasson, 2007: Ch. 6 & 7, and Hirsch 1993 and 
2002. 
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causes there to be a sandcastle, but doesn’t bring about a table when it holds 
between table-simples. Horgan (1993) echoes this sentiment:
[An] adequate metaphysical theory – like an adequate scientific theory – should itself 
be systematic and general, and should keep to a minimum the unexplained facts that it 
posits. In particular, a good metaphysical or scientific theory, should avoid positing a 
plethora of quite specific, disconnected, sui generis, compositional facts. Such facts 
would be ontological danglers; they would be metaphysically queer. Even though 
explanation presumably must bottom out somewhere, it is just not credible – or even 
intelligible – that it should bottom out with specific compositional facts which 
themselves are utterly unexplainable and which do not conform to any systematic 
general principles. Rather, if one bunch of physical simples do not compose a genuine 
object, but another bunch of simples do not compose any genuine object, then there 
must be some reason why; it couldn’t be that these two facts are themselves at the 
explanatory bedrock of being. 
In sum, the objection van Inwagen and Horgan are going for is this: 
disjunctive answers to the SCQ posit a number of disconnected compositional 
facts; but it’s highly unlikely nature has those disconnected facts; so 
disjunctive answers are highly likely to be false. The critical reader might 
point out here that we have strong (Moorean) beliefs that there are composite 
objects – here is a sandcastle, and there’s a table. We should consequently take 
the presence of such composite objects to show that composition is indeed a 
messy affair; that it is a messy affair should thus pose no strong objection to 
folk ontology. I will later suggest, in discussing premise 5) of van Inwagen’s 
argument, a further problem of disjunctive answers which follow from such 
Moorean considerations. 
All in all, van Inwagen takes composition to have the following features: it is 
mind-independent (in the way earlier alluded to), and it is neat. Disjunctive 
answers tend to fall short on these features, and so they’re objectionable. 
3) We should rule out highly implausible answers to the SCQ. 
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An unremarkable premise. Together with 1b) and 2) they give:
4) The right answer to the SCQ is uniform in nature. [1b, 2, 3]
We move on to premise 5):
5) Any answer to the SCQ that is uniform in nature would, prima facie, rule 
out the existence of composite objects.
Van Inwagen can be seen to hold 5) because any answer to the SCQ that is 
uniform in nature contains at most one bonding relation – and this feature of 
uniform answers lends itself easily to putative counterexamples. Take, for 
example, the uniform answer y the xs compose y iff the xs are fastened 
together, where “fastened together” can be taken to mean “placed in contact in 
such a way that some minimum force F is needed to separate them” (again, the 
rough idea suffices for our purposes here). Yet if the hands of another person 
and I were to be fastened together, we wouldn’t say that we have brought into 
existence some object that has our hands or bodies as parts. So fastening can’t 
be the means by which we compose objects; it can’t be the relation that holds
between simples which suffices for composition. This vulnerability to 
counterexamples seems to extend to most if not all uniform answers.
Generally, we note that uniform answers, because they have only one bonding 
relation, are prone to counterexamples. We can increase the number of 
bonding relations involved, but that would be to change our answer to a 
disjunctive answer with their attendant worries noted above. Alternatively, we 
can take the fact that composition involves only one bonding relation to show 
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that composition does not occur – for there is no general way for composition 
involving only one bonding relation to occur that is uncontroversial, but that is 
precisely what’s needed for composition to occur; so composition doesn’t 
occur. And so, prima facie, no composite objects exist.
Why the qualification prima facie here? That’s because we might have 
independent grounds for believing in the existence of certain composite 
objects. If so, then we might still have a uniform answer to the SCQ.
Suppose, for instance, God reveals to us that there are such things as tables –
when certain table-simples are arranged in a certain way, there is a composite 
object, a table. And suppose composition doesn’t occur otherwise. Then we 
have independent grounds to hold tables exist, and so we should revise our 
answer to the SCQ to include tables. (Our answer should then be: y the xs 
compose y iff the xs are T-simples and they are arranged in so and so ways). 
As a matter of fact, van Inwagen thinks we do have independent reason to 
believe composite objects such as organisms exist – we’ll come to that shortly. 
Such independent grounds aside, however, we should hold that uniform 
answers to the SCQ are indeed vulnerable to counterexamples, and thus they 
fail to be sufficient answers. So any answer to the SCQ that is uniform in 
nature would rule out the existence of composite objects, unless we have good 
independent reason to believe in that composite object.  
A separate caveat here: premise 5) puts forth that any answer to the SCQ that 
is uniform in nature would prima facie rule out the existence of composite 
objects. That’s not quite true. Universalism (see footnote 1) is a uniform 
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answer, but far from ruling out the existence of composite objects, it allows 
for a plethora of composite objects. I’ve chosen to take Universalism out of 
the equation mainly for the sake of brevity; van Inwagen proposes a cogent 
argument against Universalism in Ch. 8 of his book, but we would do no
justice to Universalism and its detractors wading into that debate here. At any 
rate, our task here is to critically assess van Inwagen’s position while granting 
as much ground to him as possible. The truth of Universalism would indeed 
undermine his project, but that is a task that can be undertaken elsewhere. I 
will thus proceed with Universalism out of the equation. 
Now, it might be thought that there are indeed instances of a universal bonding 
relation that work and others that don’t. In the given example, it might seem 
strange to say there’s an object composed of our fastened hands – but it 
wouldn’t seem so strange to say that when hands are fastened in a certain 
context, a prayer-circle which has our hands as parts forms. What this seems 
to suggest is that composition is a matter of many bonding relations. If that’s 
right, there is no univocal answer to the SCQ. Consideration of van Inwagen’s 
support for 5) prompts us to deny 2) then – the answer to the SCQ should be a 
disjunctive one. That is, when we consider single bonding relations that don’t 
work on occasion, we realize that single bonding relations do work on 
occasion. So the answer to the SCQ is a disjunctive one. Note here that this is 
made possible by our intuition that prayer-circles exist, which ties in with the 
Moorean argument (or argument from common sense) that here’s a table, and 
there’s a prayer-circle –different types of composite objects exist, so 
composition must be a matter of myriad bonding relations. 
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Moorean arguments in mereology have been considered in the literature (see, 
for example, Sider (2013)) and, I suspect, escalate to tricky meta-metaphysical 
questions very quickly. Here let me afford one non-meta-metaphysical 
comment on van Inwagen’s behalf8. Suppose we grant fastening is one of 
many bonding relations which constitute composition. But then we can 
construct a Sorites series of fastening. That’s because the relation being 
fastened together admits of degrees. Let us say hands fastened together to a 
degree of 0.3 under the right circumstances composes a prayer-circle. But then 
so should hands fastened to a degree of 0.29999. If that’s right, then so should 
hands fastened to a degree of 0.29998, and so on. Soon we realize that hands 
fastened to a miniscule degree – or to an extremely large degree – composes a 
prayer-circle, something we might not want to accept. This calls into question 
our starting assumption, that hands fastened together to a degree of 0.3 under 
the right circumstances composes a prayer-circle. This is of course a problem 
with any uniform answer involving fastening. But the problem is compounded 
for disjunctive answers including fastening as a bonding relation, for 
presumably such answers include other physical bonding relations such as 
welding, or stacking, relations which are prone to Sorites reasoning too. This 
line of reasoning can be seen as another way of establishing that composition 
doesn’t occur, because any bonding relation is problematic. Consideration of 
“typical” uniform answers to the SCQ (answers involving fastening, or 
welding, etc), then, leads us to rule out composite objects through putative 
counterexamples or by Sorites sequences - ergo, 5). 
                                               
8The following can be found in Markosian (1998). 
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6) The right answer to the SCQ would, prima facie, rule out composite 
objects. [4, 5]
6) follows directly from 4) and 5). What 6) entails is that prima facie, 
composite objects don’t exist. Part III of van Inwagen’s argument seeks to 
establish independent ground for believing in the existence of organisms. 
Establishing that will allow van Inwagen to be a nihilist about non-living 
composite objects but not living objects. 
Part III
7) Persons, which are composite objects, exist. 
There are two parts to this premise. First, that persons exist; and second, that 
persons are composite objects. That persons exist should be straightforward 
enough – whatever the nature of persons, it is clear there is an object here now 
thinking (or doubting) these thoughts. That’s a person. Van Inwagen’s main 
support for the second part of the premise – that persons are composite objects 
– comes from his belief that an activity like thinking, of which we evidently 
perform, can only be predicated of a composite entity. He writes9: 
In my view, we do have a need for “one”, that is, for the individual thing that thinks. I 
do not see how we can regard thinking as a mere cooperative activity. Things can 
work together to produce light. They might do this by composing a single object – a 
firefly, say – that emits light. But things that work together to produce light are not 
forced, by the very nature of the task set them, to produce light by composing a single 
object that emits light. And things that work together to support weight are not forced, 
by the very nature of the task set them, to support weight by composing a single 
object that hold things aloft. But things cannot work together to think – or, at least, 
things can work together to think only in the sense that they can compose, in the strict 
and mereological understanding of the word, an object that things. (I am, incidentally, 
using ‘think’ in a very liberal sense, sufficiently liberal that I will count such items as 
feeling pain as instances of thinking.)Now, surely, planning for tomorrow or feeling 
cannot be activities that a lot of simples can perform collectively, as simples can 
collectively shine or collectively support a weight?
- pg 118-119.
                                               
9Note that van Inwagen is taking on a materialist position here. This is not a matter central to 
our concerns, as the nihilism we’re examining here concern themselves, or should concern 
themselves,  with material beings.
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To van Inwagen, thinking requires there to be composite beings. Since we 
evidently think, and since we are evidently persons, it should follow that 
persons are composite beings. 
8) If persons exist, organisms exist. 
As van Inwagen understands it, organisms are composite objects, where the 
activity of their parts constitutes a life. Van Inwagen has no fast and ready 
definition of lives – indeed, the concept is a vague one for him – but he offers 
some analogies as a way of describing what lives might be. Think of a club, 
whose membership is in constant flux. We might think of such a club as a 
having a skeleton – a constitution, as van Inwagen calls it – that consists of ‘a 
complex set of dispositions and intentions that is maintained by the assiduous 
indoctrination of new members’ (pg 84). Or think of the Great Red Spot on 
Jupiter, which is a storm that has been raging on for hundreds of years. We 
might think of the storm as having an overall structure in which swirls of 
atoms are inducted or expelled all the time. This process is what van Inwagen 
calls a ‘homeodynamic event’. And lives function essentially as such events; 
they involve an ongoing process, an ongoing event, which inducts or expels 
atoms all the time, just as the coming and going of members of a club 
constitute an ongoing event.  And all those atomic simples that were caught up 
in this ongoing process can be legitimately said to compose a life. Now, to be 
sure, van Inwagen doesn’t think clubs or storms exist. We’ll take a closer look 
at some of the features of lives later in section 2 of this chapter, and why clubs 
and storms don’t exist for van Inwagen; here we simply note that lives 
essentially involve homeodynamic events.  
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Van Inwagen thinks 8) because there seems no reason to think that thinking is 
essential to our existence. What exactly ‘binds the simples that compose me 
into a single being’ (pg 121) then? Well, it has to be that those simples 
constituted a life, which is an event of sorts. And if these simples in me 
constitute a life, then other simples in other beings must do the same. So other 
persons, other composite beings, exist. And it would be ‘an arbitrary position 
indeed’ to think that simples might constitute human lives but not the lives of 
any other animal, so other animals exist. The overall point here is that there is 
nothing remarkably special about thinking, human persons. What matters for 
composition here, is the conducting of activities of simples that constitute a 
life. Premise 8) seeks to capture this fact. 
We should note here that this move for van Inwagen is a tricky one. After all, 
if we understand lives as essentially homeodynamic events, as van Inwagen 
seems to do, then we might wonder if we can’t also consider a table as being a 
homeodynamic event – in which case it exists as a composite object. We’ll 
return to this later in the chapter.  
7) and 8), of course, gives us 9):
9) Organisms exist.[7, 8]
And finally,
10) The only right answer to the SCQ compatible with 6) and 9) is van 
Inwagen’s partial nihilism: y the xs compose y iff the activity of the xs 
constitutes a life. [1a), 6), 9)]
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Recall 6): The right answer to the SCQ would, prima facie, rule out composite 
objects. But we also have grounds to believe that organisms – which are 
composite objects (see above) – exist. Since all there is to organisms, as van 
Inwagen uses the term, is that the activity of their parts constitutes a life, 10) 
follows. And so partial nihilism is true: y the xs compose y iff the activity of 
the xs constitutes a life.
In sum, van Inwagen thinks uniform answers are the way to go in answering 
the SCQ. Uniform answers tend to rule out composite objects, however. At the 
same time, we have good, independent reason to think we exist, which gives 
us reason to believe organisms exist. And since we are composite objects (it 
seems), organisms are composite objects too. Van Inwagen’s proposed answer 
to the SCQ takes this into account, providing a uniform answer that rules out 
all composite objects but organisms. (We should also note here that van 
Inwagen’s answer doesn’t seem vulnerable to counterexamples in the way 
other uniform answers seem to be, which lends some initial plausibility to his 
account). 
Now, we may very well ask van Inwagen if we have not independent reason to 
think inanimate composite objects exist, just as we seem to have independent 
reason to think we exist. A quick response here on van Inwagen’s behalf is to 
note once again what was quoted above: the work done by such objects can be 
attributed to the work done by simples arranged that-object-wise. On the other 
hand, certain work done by persons can’t, or don’t, seem to be done 
collectively by simples – arguably, it makes no sense to say simples are 
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collectively thinking, for example10. That seems to be the differentiating factor 
for van Inwagen to hold that we have sufficient independent grounds to 
believe in our composite existence but not in inanimate composite objects. 
That said, we’ll see this thrust against van Inwagen developed in finer detail in 
the next section.
Let’s close this section with a recap of what we’ve covered: 
1a) There is one (and only one) right answer to the SCQ.
1b) Any answer to the SCQ is either uniform or disjunctive in nature.  
[Assumptions]
2) A disjunctive answer is highly implausible. 
3) We should rule out highly implausible answers to the SCQ. 
4) The right answer to the SCQ is uniform in nature. [1b, 2, 3]
5) Any answer to the SCQ that is uniform in nature would, prima facie, rule 
out the existence of composite objects.
6) The right answer to the SCQ would, prima facie, rule out composite 
objects. [4, 5]
7) Persons, which are composite objects, exist. 
8) If persons exist, organisms exist. 
9) Organisms exist.[7, 8]
Conclusion:
10) The only right answer to the SCQ compatible with 6) and 9) is van 
Inwagen’s partial nihilism: y the xs compose y iff the activity of the xs 
constitutes a life. [1a), 6), 9)]
2. Reductionism
A reductionist can go with uniform or disjunctive answers. There are 
correspondingly at least two moves he can make: on the side of uniform 
answers, he can deny premise 5); on the side of disjunctive answers, he can 
deny premise 2). Finally, a reductionist, as I will suggest, can also point out 
                                               
10 We shall see this sentiment echoed in Merricks later on. 
Page 29 of 66
that van Inwagen’s argument is incomplete. Let’s consider these moves in 
turn. 
A reductionist can go along with a uniform answer to the SCQ but take issue 
with premise 5): Any answer to the SCQ that is uniform in nature would, 
prima facie, rule out the existence of composite objects. Recall that van 
Inwagen’s support for this lies in depicting the picture that uniform answers 
will tend to be vulnerable to certain sorts of counterexamples. A reductionist 
can seek to disarm the force of these counterexamples. He may put forth, for 
example, that when we’ve fastened two hands together there now exists one 
object that is composed of the two hands, and there’s nothing objectionable to 
that because that one object reduces to those constituents. If fastening is the 
way to compose objects, then we have created an object when we’ve fastened 
two hands together – it’s just not a very remarkable object in the way a table is 
usefully created by fastening four legs and a tabletop together. 
It will be worth exploring why van Inwagen doesn’t adopt this reductionist 
stance. That is, why does he so easily accept the force of such 
counterexamples, such that he would reject fastening as an answer to the SCQ 
because of that mentioned counterexample? I submit that it is because van
Inwagen adopts the (emergentist) principle that creation is to add to the 
fundamental furniture of the world. In considering whether a fort is built by 
legionnaires in a desert, he says: ‘I should say that they have not. They have, 
to use a phrase I used earlier, rearranged the furniture of earth without adding 
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to it’ (pg 124). To van Inwagen, simply rearranging simples about shouldn’t 
create anything. 
Adopting such a principle compels one to be skeptical if we can so easily 
create objects, and thus put more stock into the force of the mentioned 
counterexamples11. Note though that adopting such a principle poses a 
problem more for the emergentist reductionist than the simple reductionist. 
After all, the emergentist reductionist would probably want to say a fort is 
“over and above” its constituent sand-particles; to create a fort then, is to add 
something new and fundamental to the world, in the sense that where 
previously there were N sand-particles, there are now N+1 objects. But to 
adopt van Inwagen’s principle of creation would run the emergentist 
reductionist into trouble when it comes to two hands being fastened together –
for presumably it should not be so easy to add to the fundamental furniture of 
the world. A simple reductionist, on the other hand, would be far more willing 
to give up van Inwagen’s principle of creation; it is possible to create objects 
without adding to the furniture of the world: we’ve created a fort by shifting 
sand-particles around, but the fort exists wholly in virtue of those sand-
particles. If that’s right, then there’s nothing too disconcerting for the simple 
reductionist to entertain putative counterexamples to single bonding relations 
or processes.  In rejecting uniform answers to the SCQ, van Inwagen seems to 
have implicitly adopted a certain principle of creation. But we’ve just seen 
how doing so works primarily against the emergentist reductionist. The simple 
                                               
11 One may note here that this principle implies that we never create anything, except possibly 
babies, which seems obviously false. In van inwagen’s defense perhaps what we could say 
here is that we don’t genuinely create anything, so it’s still true we create things, loosely 
speaking. That said, as far as I can tell, van Inwagen provides little motivation for this 
principle. Thanks to Michael Pelczar for pointing these out.  
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reductionist is still free to reasonably maintain his or her uniform answer to 
the SCQ. 
That said, a reductionist may wish to adopt a disjunctive answer to the SCQ 
instead. That may be because reductionism seems to go hand-in-hand with 
Mooreanism about ordinary composite objects: many ordinary objects exist, 
and there’s nothing too remarkable about them, as they reduce to fundamental 
physical parts anyway. If so, he would disagree with premise 2) of van 
Inwagen’s argument – that a disjunctive answer is highly implausible.
There are two variations of this stance. The reductionist can agree with van 
Inwagen that composition is an internal relation, where an internal relation is 
understood here as only involving spatiotemporal and/or causal relations 
between the simples of a composite object. If so, she will hold there are 
numerous internal relations involved in composition, and we will have to work 
out which ones do indeed give rise to composite objects and which ones don’t. 
This however still faces the question of why certain internal relations cause 
composition and why a slightly differing arrangement doesn’t. A reductionist 
can also hold that composition is not solely an internal relation. It involves the 
attitudes or beliefs of a community, for example. So a table, an object 
composed of so and so parts, exists in part because of certain norms in our 
community. This goes back to the question of whether composition is, or 
should be, an internal or an external phenomenon. Resolving the debate over 
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premise 2) of van Inwagen’s argument is out of the scope of this paper. It will 
do to note that there is a sensible way out for reductionists over here12. 
One last move the reductionist can make against van Inwagen is to point out 
that his argument is incomplete. Specifically, we may point out that van 
Inwagen should by his own lights add the following premise:
9*) If organisms exist, ordinary objects exist.
If so, then van Inwagen is not entitled to draw his conclusion 10). It will be 
informative to first consider a line of thought for 9*) that doesn’t work. We 
might think 9*) because we might translate premise 8) above as: If persons 
exist, composite objects whose activity of their parts constitute a life exist. 
And if we understand lives rudimentarily as things which possess a certain 
homeodynamic structure, then we might think tables (and storms, and waves) 
are lives too, for a table has parts that, we might think, are bonded in a way 
that keeps a certain physical equilibrium. It is perhaps for this reason that van 
Inwagen shores up the concept of a life with more features, such that 8) is to 
be analyzed as saying:
8*) If persons exist, composite objects whose activity of their parts constitute 
a homeodynamic, self-maintaining, well-individuated, jealous event exist.
                                               
12 Moorean arguments for ordinary composite objects will be problematized in the next 
chapter. They are not essential in opposing premise 2) of van Inwagen’s argument however. 
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These are features van Inwagen understands lives by (see pg 121). A 
homeodynamic event presumably refers to, as indicated above, an ongoing 
process of a body maintaining its structure. Self-maintenance presumably 
means the homeodynamic maintenance of a body through orders from its own 
“script”, as opposed to orders from external bodies. So a fire self-maintains, 
but an ordinary building doesn’t. A well-individuated event refers to an event 
that is easy to distinguish from others across time and place. And a jealous
event is whose components cannot constitute more than one of the same type 
of event at the same time. Understood this way, storms, tables and clubs don’t 
seem to be lives, for while they might be homeodynamic and even self-
maintaining, they don’t seem to be well-individuated or jealous – it might be 
unclear if a storm that passes from Singapore to Malaysia is the same storm, 
and a putative part of a table could easily be said to be part of slightly different 
configuration of table-simples in the vicinity (we’ll see this in the problem of 
the many). I acknowledge there is some room for debate here, which poses a 
problem for van Inwagen. But I think there is a stronger point to be made 
against him, one that goes to the heart of the matter and one that is also 
decidedly more reductionist.    
Recall van Inwagen’s reason for thinking organisms exist: persons exist, and 
they think; thinking can’t be predicated to simples working collectively; so 
thinking can only be predicated of a single composite object; therefore persons 
exist as composite objects; therefore there are composite objects. Thinking 
requires there to be composite beings. Let’s call this the Predicate Argument. 
The Predicate Argument is meant to show that there are such things as 
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composite beings. And when we look into the nature of these composite 
beings, we realize they have certain features, features just mentioned. This is 
what led us to conclude generally that organisms – which are really just beings 
that have these features – exist. 
I venture here that the Predicate Argument is underpinned by the assumption 
that thinking is a non-reducible activity. For if it is reducible to its parts, in the 
sense that the work done by it can be attributed to the work done by simples 
that-object-wise, then thinking can be predicated of arrangements of simples –
but thinking can’t be predicated of arrangements of simples for van Inwagen, 
so thinking is not reducible to its parts. But there seems no good reason to 
think thinking can’t be performed by certain physical simples working in 
tandem; it seems more compelling to say thinking is reducible to the 
arrangement of certain simples, and so thinking can be predicated of said 
arrangement. But if thinking can be predicated of an arrangement of simples, 
then it might make more sense to say that persons exist, they think; and 
persons just are arrangements of simples. That is, there are persons, and they 
completely reduce to arrangements of simples.
If we allow that, then we allow the existence of ordinary, inanimate objects 
too. For we can reason similarly along the following lines. The existence of 
tables is reducible to the arrangement of certain simples, and just as thinking 
can be predicated of arrangements of simples, so can existence be predicated 
of a relevant arrangement. Thus tables, which just are arrangements of 
simples, exist. Note here that this line of reasoning is open only to the simple 
Page 35 of 66
reductionist, for it is essential here that the object in question be completely
reducible to their parts, and not just be reductively explained. What the 
preceding ultimately suggests is that if thinking organisms exist, then ordinary
inanimate objects exist, for appropriately arranged simples (simples working 
in tandem, perhaps maintaining a certain homeodynamic structure) is 
sufficient for the existence of certain objects. 
3. Summary
In this chapter we’ve looked at a dissection of van Inwagen’s position for his 
brand of partial nihilism, and we’ve looked at three avenues of response 
reductionists might take. Van Inwagen’s criticism of uniform answers to the 
SCQ seems to work mainly against emergentists. Simple reductionism remains 
unaffected. Mooreanism about ordinary objects might be what’s motivating 
reductionism; but in any case, reductionists who believe in the existence of a 
myriad of ordinary objects might take issue with van Inwagen’s dismissal of 
disjunctive answers to the SCQ. 
Finally, if thinking is reducible to arrangements of simples, then existence 
might be as well. At the very least, it is not clear why thinking has to be 
predicated of something more than the particular arrangements of simples, a 
composite entity “over and above” its parts (since the collective arrangement 
of simples is still not enough for thinking to happen for van Inwagen). 
Analogously, it is not clear why existence has to be predicated of something 
more than the particular arrangements of simples, a composite entity “over and 
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above” its parts. There could very well be a composite table that exists wholly 
in virtue of simples arranged that-tablewise. 
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Chapter 3: The Overdetermination Argument
Trenton Merricks, as with van Inwagen, believes that there are no composite 
objects save for certain living objects. I will first give an exposition of 
Merricks’ position, and then address some criticisms that have been leveled 
against the argument. I will conclude by considering two lines a reductionist 
might take against him. 
1. Merricks’ Overdetermination Argument
Trenton Merricks, in his book Objects and Persons, provides an argument for 
the elimination of most ordinary objects. It runs as follows:
1)  The baseball – if it exists – is causally irrelevant to whether its constituent 
atoms, acting in concert, cause the shattering of the window. 
2) The shattering of the window is caused by those atoms, acting in concert. 
3) The shattering of the window is not overdetermined. 
Thus, 4) If the baseball exists, it does not cause the shattering of the window. 
- Merricks, 2001: 56. 
It is easy to see how this argument generalizes. The main idea behind the 
argument - the Overdetermination Argument, as Merricks calls it - is that to 
exist is to have genuine causal powers. Since all of the causal work of macro-
objects can purportedly be done by its constituent atoms, including, 
importantly, our perception of them, then those macro-objects do not have 
genuine causal powers, and we thus lack a good reason to believe in their 
existence. So, they don’t exist; only simples do. 
The inference of 4) from 1) to 3) is given by the following causal principle:
Page 38 of 66
Causal principle. Suppose: O is an object. The xs are objects. O is causally irrelevant 
to whether the xs, acting in concert, cause a certain effect E (i.e. O is not one of the 
xs, O is not a partial cause of E alongside the xs, none of the xs cause O to cause E, 
and O does not cause any of the xs to cause E). The xs, acting in concert, do cause E. 
And E is not overdetermined. It follows from all this that O does not cause E. 
- Merricks, 2001: 58. 
This principle seems intuitively right, and so Merricks’ argument seems 
intuitively valid. 
Merricks – as with van Inwagen - presents a separate argument to prevent 
persons (and from there, other conscious living organisms) from being 
eliminated. Here’s how it goes. 
(1) There is some intrinsic property F such that 
(a) An object’s existing and being F is not, of metaphysical necessity, implied 
by the existence and intrinsic properties of, and spatiotemporal and causal 
relations among, that object’s constituent atoms. 
(b) Humans cause things in virtue of (existing and) being F. 
(2) If (1) is true, then there is some property F such that a human’s causing 
effect E in virtue of (existing and) being F does not all by itself give one a 
reason to believe that that human’s constituent atoms cause E in virtue of their 
intrinsic properties and spatiotemporal and causal interrelations. 
(3) There is some intrinsic property F such that a human’s causing effect E in 
virtue of (existing and) being F does not all by itself give one a reason to 
believe that that human’s constituent atoms cause E in virtue of their intrinsic 
properties and spatiotemporal and causal interrelations.  [1, 2]
- Merricks, 2001: 89.
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Note here that Merricks takes the property of being conscious as the prime 
candidate for property F (see pages 93-94). The above is what Merricks dubs 
the Step One Argument. The general idea behind this argument is to suggest
that humans have causal powers that are not reducible to the causal powers of 
their parts (note that the conclusion of the argument, (3), doesn’t establish
that). To reach the stronger conclusion that persons are causally efficacious, 
Merricks embarks on what he calls the Step Two Argument. Here’s my 
reconstruction of it13. Following from the Step One Argument, 
(4) If (3) is true, persons are sometimes casually efficacious.
(5) Persons are sometimes casually efficacious. [3, 4]
(6) Persons exist. [Inference from 5]
The main work of the argument, of course, lies in premise (4)14. The broad 
idea here is that if we were to suppose that persons cause some effect E in 
virtue of having some intrinsic property F, then given that persons “float free” 
of their constituent atoms (as per premise (1a) in the Step One Argument), it 
seems intuitive to think they – and not the atoms - must have caused E. Thus 
they are (sometimes) causally efficacious. I offer a more careful and formal 
exposition of this idea, on behalf of Merricks, in the following footnote 15. In a 
                                               
13 I provide a reconstruction here partly for the sake of brevity, but also because I think this 
reconstruction would present his points in a sharper, more concise manner. The reader is free 
to compare this and Merricks’ original take found in pages 107-114 of Objects and Persons. 
14 I allude to the problem of inferring (6) from (5) in the following section. 
15  (3) and (4) can be bridged as follows:
(3i) It is a ‘real oddity’ that some atoms arranged personwise would cause E, an effect that 
was caused by a person’s having a mental property, but a person is not involved in the causal 
chain. 
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nutshell, Merricks thinks persons exist because persons have causal powers 
over and above the causal powers of their constituent atoms. And we have 
reason to think persons have causal powers over and above the powers of their 
constituent atoms because their existence is not fixed by the existence of their 
constituent atoms (along with their relations). 
For the rest of this paper, I will set Merricks’ argument for the existence of 
composite persons aside. As we shall see, Merricks’ nihilism against nonliving 
composite objects might not work anyway. First, however, let’s turn to a few 
objections that have been raised against Merricks and see how they fare.  
2. Some objections
(i) Overdetermination is not objectionable
This response was posed in Sider (2003). If overdetermination does happen, 
then we can directly question premise (3) of Merricks’ Overdetermination 
Argument. Sider puts forth that the ‘epistemic objection’ to overdetermination 
– which is the broad idea that ‘we have no reason to believe in 
overdetermining entities’  - is a ‘reasonable’ one (pg 724-725). But he 
ultimately suggests this is still not enough to establish that there are no 
                                                                                                                          
(3ii) Suppose a human person causes an effect E in virtue of (existing and) having a conscious 
mental property. Then there is no reason to think that that same effect is caused by any atoms 
in such a way that the person is causally irrelevant to those atoms causing that effect. [3, 3i]
In other words,
(3iii) Suppose a human person causes an effect E in virtue of (existing and) having a 
conscious mental property. Then E is caused by a person’s constituent atoms only if that 
person is causally relevant to whether those atoms cause E. 
And this just implies (4). 
Page 41 of 66
overdetermining entities. The crux of his point lies in the notion that macro-
entities could very well be argued for on grounds other than the causal powers 
they hold. As he says: ‘few philosophers defending non-living macro-entities 
have ever rested their case on the simple causal argument that these entities 
must be postulated as causes of our experience’ (pg 725). So, it could very 
well be the case that macro-entities exist, and they overdetermine events. So 
the shattering of the window was overdetermined.
Common-sensical, Moorean arguments for ordinary composite objects are 
tricky and bring in their host of meta-ontological issues, issues that I can’t 
adequately resolve here. That’s because such arguments tend to be motivated 
by a certain view about how we should theorize about ontology. Some 
philosophers, for example Quine (1948) and Hirsh (2002), hold that our
ontological commitments can and should be read off true existential claims; 
others like Cameron (2010) hold that ‘to conclude that we are ontologically 
committed to the Xs just because there is a true sentence in English (or even a 
regimented English) that proclaims the existence of the Xs is to read off 
features of the world from features of our representations of the world in an 
objectionable way’ (pg 11). The former group of philosophers would surely be 
sympathetic to arguments from common-sense for ordinary composite objects. 
But how compelling such arguments would go depend on one’s meta-
ontological position in the first place, and it will do to note here that Quine’s 
and Hirsh’s position are far from firmly established – see for example Schaffer 
(2009) and Sider (2014). 
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Setting them aside, an argument one can put forth for macro-entities would be 
any decent argument for Universalism, which is the thesis that two physical 
objects will always compose a further, third physical object.   It will be 
difficult to adjudicate the debate between Universalism and Nihilism here. 
Typically though, motivations for the former have been that they resolve 
certain philosophical puzzles, puzzles that Nihilism purport to solve too. 
Given that they solve those puzzles equally well, I would think Nihilism has a 
certain edge here, since it is a theory that posits fewer entities (a lot fewer) its 
rival. That aside, I, as with Merricks, personally find it highly puzzling that the 
world may be such that overdetermination is rampant. Any position that 
entails that it is rampant should have a lot of things going for it as compared to 
her rivals, and suffice to say here it is far from clear to me that Universalism 
has that. 
So my reply here is to ask, as before: what strong reason do we have to believe 
in overdetermining entities?, bearing in mind here that the very term implies 
entities that cause things their parts actually cause. Lacking such a reason, we 
shouldn’t believe there are such entities, and thus we shouldn’t believe that the 
shattering of the window was overdetermined. 
(ii) There is macrophysical causation, so there are macrophysical objects
Jonathan Lowe puts forth an objection that Merricks in my view responds to 
adequately. It is nonetheless an objection worth mentioning. 
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The objection goes as follows. Baseballs, it seems, have something their 
simple parts don’t: a momentum. That’s because it doesn’t make sense to say 
that the collection of atoms arranged baseballwise have a collective velocity, 
in the same way as it doesn’t make sense to speak of the velocity of a flock of 
birds (velocity is not additive, so it makes sense only to speak of the average
velocity of the flock). And since momentum is the product of mass and 
velocity it doesn’t make sense to speak of the momentum of the atoms 
arranged baseballwise. Now, it would also seem that it is the momentum of the 
baseball that causes the shattering of the window. And since momentum is 
something the baseball’s simple parts can’t have, it would be reasonable to say 
the baseball caused the shattering of the window, that is, it is causally potent. 
So it exists16. More generally, various macrophysical objects exist because 
they possess certain causally efficacious macrophysical properties that their 
parts can’t possess, “collectively” or otherwise. 
Merricks’ reply is that even if it is the case baseballs have causally efficacious 
macrophysical properties their parts don’t, baseballs are still causally 
redundant. That’s because even if the baseball did cause the shattering of the 
window due to its momentum, the shattering of the window can still be 
explained in terms of the simple parts of the baseball: for example, this 
baseball particle here hit that glass-particle there with so-and-so force that 
resulted in the latter travelling a certain direction. So if we are to accept the 
existence of the baseball, we have to, it seems, accept overdetermination17. 
Given that we don’t wish to accept overdetermination, we should reject the 
                                               
16 This objection is found in Lowe, 2003. 
17 Merricks’ reply can be found in Merricks, 2003. 
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existence of either or both causes of the event; and rejecting the existence of 
the baseball would be the more reasonable choice. 
The overall point here is that having causally efficacious macrophysical 
properties doesn’t necessarily translate to having causally non-redundant 
powers. For Lowe to conclusively establish that macrophysical objects exist 
he will have to show that they cause events that their parts (or anything else) 
don’t sufficiently cause. This will be what it truly means to be causally non-
redundant. 
(iii) Analyticity and non-overdetermination
Thomasson (2007) provides an objection against Merricks along the lines that 
the sort of overdetermination in Merricks’ Overdetermination Argument is 
entirely nonproblematic because of the analytic interrelation between the 
claims “atoms arranged baseballwise caused the shattering of the window” and 
“the baseball caused the shattering of the window”. 
Here’s an outline of her position. The claim “atoms arranged baseballwise 
caused the shattering of the window” analytically entails the claim “the 
baseball caused the shattering of the window”, because any competent speaker 
who understands the terms in the first statement, ‘and knows it is true that 
atoms arranged baseballwise are causally relevant to the shattering need 
investigate the world no further to infer that a baseball was causally relevant’ 
(Thomasson, 2007: 10) as well. This is how we know the two claims are 
analytically related.  Indeed, something similar seems to be going on when we 
infer the truth of the claim “a building is being burnt” from the statement “a 
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house is being burnt”. In this latter case, any competent speaker of the English 
language need not investigate the world further to know that a building is 
being burnt, once he knows a house is being burnt. So just as “a house is being 
burnt” analytically entails “a building is being burnt”, “atoms arranged 
baseballwise caused the shattering of the window” analytically entails “the 
baseball caused the shattering of the window”. 
Now, given such analytic entailments, there doesn’t seem to be a substantive, 
genuine sort of overdetermination when we consider the notion that both the 
baseball and the atoms arranged baseballwise caused the shattering of the 
window.
As Thomasson writes, 
For provided there are such analytic interrelations, there is no rivalry between the 
atoms arranged baseballwise’s claim to be causally relevant to the shattering and the 
baseball’s claim to causal relevance, and so acknowledging the atoms’ causal role 
gives us no reason to deny the baseball’s – indeed, nothing in the analytic relations 
among these claims gives us reason to assert the baseball’s causal efficacy if we 
assert the collective causal efficacy of its constituting atoms. Nor does accepting the 
claim of each mean accepting real ‘overdetermination’ in the sense of positing causes 
that do ‘double’ the work necessary. 
- Thomasson, 2007: 10. 
We can see the intuitive plausibility of such a response when we consider how 
we are not saying there are 2 things being burnt, even though both “a building 
is being burnt” and “a house is being burnt” turn out to be true. Similarly, 
there are not 2 independent causes in the form of a baseball and atoms 
arranged baseballwise even though both “the atoms arranged baseballwise 
caused the shattering of the window” and “the baseball caused the shattering 
of the window” turn out true. Thus there is no real overdetermination 
involved. Further, as Thomasson points out above, given the analytic 
interrelations between the 2 claims, the baseball is indeed causally efficacious, 
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as long as the atoms arranged baseballwise are causally efficacious.  As such, 
Merricks’ Overdetermination Argument is invalid: we can accept all its
premises, and still maintain that if the baseball exists, it causes the shattering 
of the window18. 
Before I give my response, we should note the difference between 
Thomasson’s objection and Sider’s. Sider grants that there is real 
overdetermination – but ultimately suggests that we should embrace it because 
we possibly have good, independent reasons for believing in macrophysical 
composite objects. If the world is such that these objects overdetermine events 
along with their microphysical parts, then so be it – we have reason to think 
they exist nonetheless. Thomasson’s objection is that there is no real 
overdetermination, even if baseballs and their microphysical parts are causally
efficacious. That’s simply the result of the analytic relation baseballs have 
with atoms arranged baseballwise. 
Thomasson’s criticism in my view misses the mark. That’s because “house” 
and “building” in our example refers to the very same thing. That’s precisely 
why we wouldn’t say there are two things burning instead of one. If they refer 
to different things – if, for example, “building” in our example refers to an 
abstract entity of sorts, but “house” refers to that object there, we have a case 
where both an abstract entity and a concrete object is burning. But that’s not 
the case. 
                                               
18 See Thomasson (2007), Chapter 2 for a more thorough diagnosis of Merricks’ position. In 
particular, she objects to the principle of inference Merricks relies on in inferring his 
conclusion from (1) to (3) of his premises. 
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One way of seeing how they refer to the same thing goes as follows. “A house 
is being burnt” can be translated to “an instantiation of a building is being 
burnt”. And “a building is being burnt” can be translated to “an instantiation of 
a building is being burnt”. If that’s right, then I the two instantiated entities do 
refer to the same thing. 
So “house” and “building” refer to the same thing in the context we’re 
considering. The same goes for “atoms arranged baseballwise” and “baseball” 
– for Thomasson’s point to work, they should refer to the same thing. But if 
so, then it’s naturally right to say the baseball and the atoms arranged 
baseballwise are causally efficacious. That’s essentially saying the atoms 
arranged baseballwise and the atoms arranged baseballwise are causally 
efficacious, something Merricks would evidently accept. That’s also what a 
complete reductionist about baseballs (into atoms arranged baseballwise)
would maintain, in the same manner a complete reductionist about heat would 
maintain that “heat caused the balloon to rise” is essentially saying “molecular 
kinetic energy caused the balloon to rise”. 
Where Thomasson has missed the mark is in assuming Merricks’ argument 
has in its scope a baseball being completely reducible to its parts. Merricks’ 
argument is primarily concerned with the N+1 view of objects – that the 
baseball is something distinct from its parts. That is, if some object O is a 
composite object, it cannot be completely reducible to its parts (along with 
their relations). So it has to be distinct from them. So there are not N (simple) 
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objects where a baseball is, but N + 1 objects19. In responding to a similar 
objection, the objection that a baseball shattering the window just is for its 
parts to shatter the window – thus there is only pseudo-overdetermination 
going on here, for example, he replies:
But a(n alleged) baseball and its atoms, all being objects, do the same kind of causal 
work. So if they all caused the same effect – like the shattering of the window – the 
baseball would thereby redundantly duplicate the work of its atoms. And so the 
baseball and its atoms would really overdetermine that effect. 
- Merricks, 2001: 70; emphasis mine.
Here it seems that Merricks is taking the baseball to be something “over and 
above” the atoms arranged baseballwise – hence if they both exist, there is a 
redundant and real duplication of causes. 
So, Thomasson may be right that Merricks’ conclusion 4) does not follow 
from his premises 1) to 3). But that’s still fine for Merricks, because 
Thomasson is using the term baseball differently from him. If a baseball does 
indeed refer to exactly what atoms arranged baseballwise refer to, then I 
suggest that Merricks would be happy to grant that baseballs are causally 
efficacious – after all, atoms arranged baseballs are causally efficacious. But 
the Overdetermination Argument is squared against baseballs that don’t refer 
exactly to what atoms arranged baseballwise refer to. As it stands then, it is 
still valid. 
The preceding can be summed up by considering the following three 
statements:
1) There are no baseballs – there are no objects that have parts. 
2) There are baseballs – they’re just atoms arranged baseballwise. 
                                               
19 Merricks explicitly denies – and gives arguments against - the thesis known as ‘composition 
as identity’ in Merricks, 2001: 20-28. 
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3) There are baseballs – these are objects whose existences are distinct from, 
but can be explained in terms of, atoms arranged baseballwise. 
1) is a statement of nihilism. 2) is a statement of complete reductionism. 3) is a 
statement of emergentist reductionism. What Thomasson has done is push
Merricks from 1) to 2). But 2) is not a statement Merricks would openly 
disagree with: there is nothing inconsistent in saying there are no baseballs –
there are no objects that have parts; and there are baseballs – there are atoms 
arranged baseballwise. Merricks’ case of overdetermination is effectively built 
against emergentist reductionism (or emergentism in general), and it’s hard to 
see why and how he might resist complete reductionism. For there to be an 
inconsistency between his brand of nihilism and reductionism, 2) should entail 
that there is an object that has parts. That is, atoms arranged baseballwise 
should be a sufficient condition for the existence of baseballs, an object that 
has parts. Whether that is the case remains unclear. 
3. Reductionism
In this section I will consider one line of attack for the reductionist that doesn’t 
seem to work. And then I’ll put forth one that does seem to work.
First, a reductionist might say the following: “The baseball exists. It is an 
object that has proper parts. And since, we grant, there is nothing in an 
arrangement of baseball-atoms that guarantees there being an object that has 
proper parts, this baseball is something distinct from that arrangement. Even 
so, its causal powers reduce to the causal powers of the atoms arranged 
baseballwise. By that we mean that everything the baseball causes can be put 
in the language of microphysics in which only the atoms arranged 
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baseballwise feature. But still the baseball exists – it has genuine causal 
powers. The fact that we can cast its powers in the language of microphysics 
doesn’t mean it doesn’t have genuine causal powers.” This objection goes 
against the causal principle that secures the validity of Merricks’ argument. 
That is, as this objection goes, it seems possible for the baseball to cause the 
shattering of the window, even if its parts caused the shattering of the window 
and the event is not overdetermined. That’s simply because the causal powers 
of the baseball reduce to the causal powers of the atoms arranged 
baseballwise. Unlike Thomasson’s objection above, this objection doesn’t 
need to presume that the baseball and atoms arranged baseballwise are the 
same thing. 
This objection wouldn’t work either. For, as with Merricks’ reply to Lowe 
above, it still isn’t the case that the baseball is causing something its parts 
aren’t causing. So even if we grant that the causal powers of the baseball 
reduce to the causal powers of its atoms arranged baseballwise in the way 
described, we have still no reason to grant the existence of the baseball. In the 
objection just put forth then, it was false to have said the baseball has genuine 
causal powers – it doesn’t. (Or at least, we haven’t seen a case in which it does 
yet). In other words, the baseball will have genuine causal powers, only if its 
powers can’t be reduced to the powers of the atoms arranged baseballwise. To 
posit that the powers of the baseball can reduce does not secure genuine 
efficacy for it.
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It appears that we have gotten to the heart of Merricks’ argument, which is 
this. Merricks holds that there are no such things as baseballs – which are 
objects that have parts – because a necessary (and sufficient) condition for 
there to be a composite object is for it to cause things its parts don’t cause. A 
reductionist might dispute this necessity. He might have some independent 
reason to believe in composite objects (most likely a Moorean sort of reason), 
so Merricks’ condition wouldn’t seem plausible to him. Note here that it does 
seem harder for the emergentist reductionist to dispute that condition. For if an 
object exists “over and above” its constituent parts, then there might be greater 
plausibility to the view that the object causes parts its constituent parts don’t 
cause. On the other hand, if it exists wholly in virtue of its simple parts, then it 
shouldn’t be unsurprising to find that it doesn’t cause parts its parts cause. 
At the very least, one can probe Merricks’ support for holding that condition. 
We may employ Merricks’ reasoning to say the following: for simples to exist 
it is necessary (and sufficient) for them to cause things macrophysical objects 
don’t cause; otherwise they do not have genuine causal powers, and so they 
don’t exist. But if so, then simples don’t exist, for, we might think, the 
baseball caused the shattering the window. But it’s absurd to think simples 
don’t exist. So Merricks is relying on a questionable line of reasoning to make 
his case20. Merricks will need further support for his principle, one that resists 
being applied equally to simples.   
                                               
20 I owe this point to Michael Pelczar. 
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4. Summary
In this chapter we have looked at Merricks’ brand of nihilism and some 
responses that have been made against it. Thomasson’s response reveals that 
Merrick’s position really is poised against emergentism. Just as van Inwagen 
implicitly adopted a standard of creation which seems to rule out the N+1, 
emergentist view, Merricks seems to have adopted a standard of existence that 
similarly rules out that view as well, the standard that to exist is for an object 
to cause things its parts don’t cause. There are two avenues for the reductionist 
to explore here, and they’re both for the simple reductionist. She can point out 
that atoms arranged baseballwise does entail there exist an object which has 
parts, since Merricks is clearly committed to the former; or she can dispute 
Merricks’ implicit standard that to exist is to cause effects one’s parts doesn’t 
cause. 
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Chapter 4: The Problem of the Many
Contemporary discussion of The Problem of the Many has been variously 
stated by, and attributed to, Geach (1980) and Unger (1980), though, to be 
sure, some form of the problem has been around since at least the Stoics21.  
The essence of the problem is this: where there is an ordinary object, say a 
table, there are many slightly differing arrangements of particles in the vicinity 
of the object, such that any one of them is as good a candidate for being that 
object as any other. So if there were an object to begin with, we ought to 
conclude there are many such objects in the vicinity of that object. If we reject 
this, we ought to conclude there wasn’t an object to begin with. 
Let’s turn now to Unger’s and Geach’s depiction of the problem. Here’s 
Lewis’ statement of Unger’s version of the problem: 
Think of a cloud – just one cloud, and around it clear blue sky. Seen from the ground, 
the cloud may seem to have a sharp boundary. Not so. The cloud is a swarm of water 
droplets. At the outskirts of the cloud the density of the droplets fall off. Eventually 
they are so few and far between that we may hesitate to say that the outlying droplets 
are still part of the cloud at all; perhaps we might better say only that they are near the 
cloud. But the transition is gradual. Many surfaces are equally good candidates to be 
the boundary of the cloud. Therefore many aggregates of droplets, some more 
inclusive and some less inclusive (and some inclusive in different ways than the 
others), are equally good candidates to be the cloud. Since they have equal claim, 
how can we say that the cloud is one of these aggregates rather than another? But if 
all of them count as clouds, then we have many clouds rather than one. And if none of 
them count, each one being ruled out because of the competition from the others, then 
we have no cloud. How is it, then, that we have just one cloud? And yet we do. 
- Lewis, 1993: 23. 
Geach uses cats for his version of the problem. Suppose there is a cat Tibbles 
lying on a mat. And suppose she has one thousand hairs. 
Now let c be the largest continuous mass of feline tissue on the mat. Then for any of 
our 1,000 hairs, say hn, there is a proper part cn of c which contains precisely all of c
except that hair hn; and every such part cn differs in a describable way both from any 
other such part say cn, and from c as a whole. Moreover, fuzzy as the concept cat may 
                                               
21 See Rea, 1997: xviii. 
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be, it is clear that not only is c a cat, but also any part cn is a cat: cn would clearly be a 
cat were the hair hn to be plucked out, and we cannot reasonably suppose that 
plucking out a hair generates a cat, so cn must already have been a cat. So contrary to 
our story, there was not just one cat called ‘Tibbles’ sitting on the mat; there were at 
least 1,001 sitting there!
- Geach, 1980: 215. 
1. The problem stated
Here is my more formal representation of the problem. I follow Unger (1980) 
closely here, but similar remarks apply in Geach’s case. 
1) If there are clouds, there are typical clouds. 
2) If there’s a typical cloud, then there are millions (at least) of other minutely 
differing concrete entities in its vicinity. 
3) Anything that differs only minutely from a typical cloud is itself a cloud. 
4) If there is a typical cloud, then there are millions of clouds in its vicinity. 
[2, 3]
5) If there are clouds, then there are millions of clouds in the vicinity of each 
typical cloud. [1, 4]
6) Either there are no clouds, or there are millions of clouds in the vicinity of 
each typical cloud.[5]
7) It’s not the case that there are millions of clouds in the vicinity of each 
typical cloud. 
8) There are no clouds. [6, 7]
Correspondingly for Geach’s problem, we have:
1) If there are cats, there are typical cats, and Tibbles is one of them.
2) If Tibbles is a typical cat, then there are 1,001 (at least) minutely differing 
concrete entities sitting on the mat.
3) Anything that differs only minutely from a typical cat is itself a cat.
4) If Tibbles is a typical cat, then there are 1,001 cats sitting on the mat.  [2, 3]
5) If there are cats, then there are 1,001 cats sitting on the mat. [1, 4]
6) Either there are no cats, or there are 1,001 cats sitting on the mat. [5]
7) It’s not the case that there are 1,001 cats sitting on the mat. 
8) There are no cats. [6, 7]
A few remarks are in order. First, a typical cloud (or a typical cat) is 
understood here as a cloud that is quite clearly a cloud to us prereflectively. 
The first premises are used to secure generality, for presumably we want to be 
concerned with all clouds, not just typical, paradigmatic ones. But nothing too 
much hangs on this; we can still prompt the existence of many clouds even in 
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the vicinity of a very sparse, marginal cloud. The relation to Sorites-style of 
reasoning should be apparent here, and I’ll touch on this later in the chapter.  
Second, “in the vicinity” can be understood either intuitively, or as saying: 
“within the spatial boundary of our paradigmatic object”. Within the spatial 
boundary of Tibbles there appears to be one cat lying on the mat. Further 
reflection on the matter, however, creates some pressure to think there may be 
many cats enclosed in that boundary, lying on the mat.
The third premises in the arguments are supported by the seemingly plausible 
notion that taking (or adding) one particle from an arrangement of particles 
composing a macro-object doesn’t make much of a difference: if there was an 
object to begin with, this slightly differing arrangement should also count as a 
similar object. There is also the worry, as stated by Geach, that if a slightly 
differing arrangement of particles doesn’t count as a similar object, then either 
cats go out of existence whenever they shed a hair (or a particle), or the very 
act of shedding a hair generates a new cat. Finally, we note that this problem 
easily extends itself to any concrete composite object. Either there are 
countless of many such objects where we think there are just one or a few, or 
there were no such concrete composite object to begin with. 
2. Some responses
In this section I’ll consider some responses that have been made to the 
problem of the many. We’ll see that these responses ultimately don’t dissolve 
the essential problem. In the next section, we’ll see how the reductionist might 
respond. 
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(i) Sharp boundaries
Perhaps it may turn out that objects have sharp, clean boundaries, and it is 
objectively clear that a cloud refers to this arrangement of matter and nothing 
else. This might be a case in which clouds are made up of homogenous, 
continuous matter, such that it is impossible to remove a part of the matter 
without removing the rest. And this continuous matter is clearly differentiated 
from its physical surroundings – it has a physical nature which is markedly 
different from the physical nature of matter in its surroundings, perhaps. If all 
this is right, then premise 2) is false: there are not millions of other minutely
differing concrete entities in the vicinity of the cloud – there is just one distinct 
blob of matter. 
Unger (1980) anticipates this move. His reply goes as follows. The problem of 
the many still remains even if it turns out objects in our world have the 
features just mentioned. That’s because we can still imagine clouds to be 
composed of discrete particles (as seems the case in our actual world right 
now). And it would seem strange to think clouds composed of our continuous 
matter composes a cloud but clouds in that instance don’t – it seems better to 
say there are clouds in both instances, just that they’re different kinds of 
clouds. But if that’s right, then if there are no clouds in our counterfactual 
scenario (where clouds are composed of discrete particles), then there 
shouldn’t be clouds in the instance we’re considering. So we’re still held 
hostage to how our initial dilemma turns out. More precisely, we can recast 
our initial dilemma as such: either there are no clouds in our continuous-matter 
world, or there are millions of clouds in the world in which clouds are 
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composed of discrete particles22. So we’re still going to have to handle the 
dilemma however clouds turn out to be in our world. 
(ii) Semantic indecision
Lewis (1993) proposes that terms like ‘cat’ and ‘Tibbles’ are vague – and 
they’re vague because we have never taken the time to settle which precise 
object we refer to in using each term. Still, we can affirm that there is just one 
cat on the mat, because it is a super-true sentence: that is, it is true under all 
ways of making the semantic decision of which precise object, which 
arrangement of cat-particles, ‘cat’ and ‘Tibbles’ refer to. 
While neat in its own way, I would suggest that Lewis’ solution can’t be the 
full solution to our problem. That’s because whichever way we resolve our 
semantic indecision would still be intolerably arbitrary. We could decide that 
‘Tibbles’ is to pick out c, the largest continuous mass of feline tissue, and c
only, but the fact still is that c1, or c2, and so on, still resemble a cat enough to 
be called a cat, assuming there was a cat in the first place.  So while “there is 
just one cat on the mat” is super-true, it is also apparently false. 
I propose to say Lewis’ response here doesn’t get to the heart of the problem, 
which is that all our cs have equal claim to be a cat. We could semantically 
decide that only one of the cs has a claim to be a cat – but that still doesn’t 
change the fact that all our cs have equal claim to being a cat. In fact, Lewis 
does concede this: ‘it’s no harm to admit that in some sense there are many 
                                               
22 We can achieve this by adding “in the discrete-particle world” after every instance of 
“typical clouds” in the formal argument presented earlier. 
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cats. What’s intolerable is to be without any good and natural sense in which 
there is only one cat’ (pg 30). But if there are many cats in some sense, then 
we have the problem of the many in some sense. And I fail to see how 
appealing to super-truth gets rid of the problem rather than hiding it away23. 
(iii) Overlapping entities
Lewis (1993) offers another solution: to treat identity as a gradual concept, 
where objects can be partially identical to another. He writes:
Assume our cat-candidates are genuine cats. (Set aside, for now, the supervaluationist 
solution.) Then, strictly speaking, the cats are many. No two of them are completely 
identical. But any two of them are almost completely identical; their differences are 
negligible, as I said before. We have many cats, each one almost identical to the 
rest…In this way, the statement that there is one cat on the mat is almost true. The 
cats are many, but almost one. By a blameless approximation, we may say simply that 
there is one cat on the mat. 
- Lewis, 1993: 33-34. 
This response is an improvement on the previous, in that it offers a clearer, 
more concrete take on the argument presented above. For if Lewis is right, we 
have a plausible way of denying premise 7). After all, the many cats are 
almost-identical because they overlap to a large extent; as such, Lewis’s 
‘blameless approximation’ notwithstanding, we can hold that there are 1,001 
cats on the mat, but deny any implausibility that comes with it. After all, since 
they overlap to a large degree, we would find that they have the weight of a 
typical cat, they eat only as much as a typical cat, and so on. (Note here that 
Lewis treats “almost-identity” as synonymous with “extensive overlap”). 
                                               
23 This notion is further supported by the notion that there doesn’t seem to be any premises the 
supervaluationist would pick on in our formal depiction of the problem. 
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There are two main issues with this response. First, suppose Tibbles were to 
lose hair n. Then she would be entirely coincident with cat cn. According to 
this solution, cn is a cat herself, one that was almost-identical to Tibbles. So 
now we have two almost-identical entities which coincide spatially 
completely. But we might have the intuition that two distinct entities cannot 
coincide spatially completely. If we wish to preserve this intuition, we will 
have to deny there were many cats. 
Second, the problem of the many may still arise in cases where the purported 
entities don’t almost completely overlap. Lewis (1993) brings up this example: 
suppose we say Fred’s house was designed by a great architect. But “Fred’s 
house” could refer either to the building containing Fred’s living quarters, or 
that and his garage. Let’s call the former Home. Then we have the following 
argument:
1) If there are such things as houses, either Home is Fred’s house, or Home-
and-garage is Fred’s house. 
2) If Home is his house, then Home-and-garage is his house too. 
3) If Home-and-garage is his house, then Home is his house too. 
4) Either there are no such things as houses, or Fred has two houses. [1, 2, 3]
5) It’s not the case Fred has two houses.
6) There are no such things as houses. [4, 5]
We have 2) and 3) because both Home and Home-and-garage seem to have 
equal claim to be Fred’s house, assuming there are such things as houses. If 
Home is Fred’s house, then adding a garage would expand his house, so 
Home-and-garage counts as a house too; and if Home-and-garage is Fred’s 
house, removing a garage wouldn’t make him houseless, so Home counts as a 
house too. And we note Lewis’s earlier response doesn’t work as well here, 
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for both Home and Home-and-garage don’t overlap intimately. If we were to 
deny 5) of this argument, as we did the analogue in Tibbles’ case, we have less 
of a case for handling the apparent implausibility that comes with it24. 
(iv) Many cat-constitutors instead
While the previous response conceded that there are many cats, and tried to 
explain away the bizarreness involved with that, perhaps we could say that 
there many cat-constitutors instead of cats, and these cat-constitutors are not
cats. This is Lowe (1995)’s response, and it denies premise 3) in our argument. 
But as noted above, Tibbles could very well lose hairn, in which case the 
resulting parcel of feline tissue would still be a cat. This suggests there was a 
cat prior to Tibbles losing hairn. So there are many cats on the mat. Lowe 
anticipates this in writing his response. 
My solution to Geach’s paradox was this: neither c nor any of the other 1,000 lumps 
of feline tissue c1, c2, … c1,000 on the mat is a cat, at least in the sense in which Tibbles 
‘is a cat’. For cats and lumps of feline tissue have different and incompatible criteria 
of identity, which import different persistence conditions for things of these 
respective kinds. c is a cat only in the sense it constitutes a cat, namely, Tibbles – and 
constitution is not identity. Similarly, each cn would be a cat only in the sense that if 
hn were plucked out, then cn would constitute Tibbles the cat. But it doesn’t follow 
that cn is a cat, in this constitutive sense, prior to hn’s being plucked out: because what 
plucking out hn does is to bring it about that cn, instead of c, constitutes Tibbles the 
cat. 
- Lowe, 1995: 179. 
Even so, we should worry that calling c1, c2 … c1000 cat-constitutors doesn’t 
change much. For as Lewis notes:
The constitutors are cat-like in size, shape, weight, inner structure, and motion. They 
vibrate and set the air in motion – in short, they purr (especially when you pat them). 
Any way a cat can be at a moment, cat-constitutors also can be; anything a cat can do 
at a moment, cat-constitutors also can do. They are all too cat-like not to be cats. 
                                               
24 We should note that Lewis acknowledges that this is a problem for his solution of almost-
identity. He takes this to show that we need supervaluationism to supplement that solution. 
But we’ve already seen how supervaluationism tends to skirt around the real issue. 
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Indeed, they may have unfeline pasts and futures, but that doesn’t show they are 
never cats; it only shows that they do not remain cats for very long. Now we have the 
paradox of 1002 cats: Tibbles the constituted cat, and also the 1001 all-too-feline cat 
constitutors. 
- Lewis, 1993: 26. 
Note that the cat-constitutors have ‘unfeline pasts and futures’ because they 
are parcels of feline tissue; the moment they gain or lose a hair, they cease to 
be that same parcel. 
Lowe (1995)’s response is to insist those cat-constitutors are not cats. After 
all, ‘the concept of a cat is an essentially historical concept, a fact which is 
reflected in the criterion of identity for cats,’ and ‘[b]eing ‘cat-like’ for a 
moment is by no means a sufficient condition for cathood’ (pg 181). 
It’s questionable if historicity is essential to the concept of a cat. It seems 
essential to our concept of a cat that it can survive the loss or gain of a hair, 
but I’m less sure what their criterion of identity is. Consequently I’m less sure 
if historicity is necessary for something to qualify as a cat. But let’s set this 
aside. There is at least one deeper worry for this proposed solution to the 
problem of the many. 
The worry can be cast as a dilemma for Lowe: either there are many cat-
constitutors or there is just one cat-constitutor c. If there are many cat-
constitutors, then not only are there many entities on the mat (where 
intuitively we would want to say there’s just one), but it’s unclear why c
constitutes our cat Tibbles but cn doesn’t constitute a cat at all. On the other 
hand, if there is just one cat-constitutor, then it is just as unclear why c is a cat-
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constitutor while any other cn are not cat-constitutors. The essential problem is 
this: if c constitutes a cat, then so should any other cn. If they do then we have 
the many. And if they don’t then something has to explain why they don’t 
whilst c constitutes a cat. It might be easier at this point to say c doesn’t 
constitute a cat – because there are no such things as cats. What there are are 
just arrangements of feline matter causing us to have the perceptions we do. 
Insofar as there is the temptation to say this, the problem of the many 
generates some pressure to be a nihilist. 
3. Sorites and reductionism
What might a reductionist say to the problem of the many? I suppose a 
reductionist holds that there are clouds, and they reduce to a collection of 
simple parts (and their relations thereof). But however we understand 
reductionism here, it seems like the problem of the many still presents itself. 
That’s because any slightly differing collection of cloud parts or cat parts 
should compose an entity that reduces to them – if the collection we were 
considering composed anything at all. So even if clouds exist, and they reduce 
to their parts, we are still going to have the problem of the many.
I suspect the reductionist will be hard-pressed to find a reductionist response 
to any premise in our argument. That’s because the problem of the many arises 
as a result of our concept of ordinary objects. After all, it is because of our 
concept of a typical cloud that we accept premise 3): anything that differs only 
minutely from a typical cloud is itself a cloud. For we would like to think one 
particle shouldn’t make a difference between being a cloud and a non-cloud. 
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This, of course, takes a leaf from Sorites reasoning. In a typical Sorites 
sequence, we are asked to consider the following: i) one grain of sand doesn’t 
make a heap; ii) adding a grain of sand to a non-heap can’t make it a heap; 
therefore iii), a million grains of sand doesn’t make a heap. And it is our 
concept of heaps that supplies ii). And presumably these are concepts a
reductionist agrees with. If so, then the problem of the many will persist for 
the reductionist.   
Perhaps the reductionist could say that a typical cloud reduces to a range of 
minutely differing concrete entities in the vicinity. So premise 2) in our cloud 
argument is false. But I’m inclined to say this is taking our concept of typical 
clouds too far – our concept of typical clouds holds that they are singular 
concrete entities, not a range. Further argument would have to be provided if 
we are to revise this concept. 
It will be worth considering why the reductionist remains relatively affected 
by the problem of the many as opposed to van Inwagen’s or Merrick’s brands 
of nihilism. I propose to say that the thrust of van Inwagen and Merrick’s 
arguments lie in their attack on objects themselves. Van Inwagen considers 
ways in which objects compose things, and finds that these ways are generally 
problematic. So by and large objects don’t compose things. Merricks considers 
the causal powers objects have, and comes to the conclusion that composite 
entities don’t exist (in general, for Merricks also wants to say persons exist) 
because if they have any causal powers, they would be superfluous. But this 
leaves ways for the reductionist to respond, for the reductionist can consider 
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relatively unproblematic ways in which composition takes place, in van 
Inwagen’s case; and she can question what it means for a composite entity to 
exist, in Merrick’s case. After all, reductionism – in particular complete 
reductionism – is a doctrine on the nature of physical objects. So it’s not 
surprising they will have responses to van Inwagen and Merricks. The 
problem of the many, with its problematization of our everyday concepts of 
ordinary objects, is a different game altogether. 
4. Closing remarks
In this paper we’ve looked at three arguments for material nihilism. We’ve 
seen various moves made against them in the literature. None of them run 
explicitly along reductionist-versus-nihilist lines. We’ve seen how van 
Inwagen and Merricks’ brands of nihilism seem poised primarily against the 
N+1 view, with the former adopting a standard of creation and the latter a 
standard of existence for macro-objects. But this leaves them open to 
rejoinders from complete reductionists, who adopt the N view. 
That said, one may wonder if complete reductionism is any different from 
material nihilism. After all, the complete reductionist would probably take a 
table to just be a tablewise arrangement of simples, a baseball to just be a 
baseballwise arrangement of simples, in the same way they might say heat just 
is molecular kinetic energy. And both van Inwagen and Merricks don’t dispute 
the existence of tablewise or baseballwise arrangements of simples. As alluded 
to in parts of the paper earlier, the debate here between the complete 
reductionist and material nihilist should tackle the question whether various 
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arrangements of simples entail that there is an material object that has parts. If 
so, then there is substantive disagreement between the two camps; if not, then 
it’s hard to see where the two camps disagree. 
The problem of the many remains a problem for anyone who wishes to hold 
onto our traditional concepts of everyday objects – holding that there is a 
cloud here which has parts exposes one to the problem that there are many 
clouds here which have parts. The problem of the many attempts to show that 
the concept of objects having parts - many ordinary objects we know of, 
anyway – is not tenable. It is a decidedly nihilist argument reductionists will 
have to take note too.    
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